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 J. SCOTT ARMSTRONG and FRED COLLOPY*
 Managers are often advised, "beat your competitors," which sometimes
 contrasts with the advice, "do the best for your firm." This may lead man-
 agers to focus on comparative measures such as market share. Drawing
 on game theory, the authors hypothesize that managers are competitor
 oriented under certain conditions, in particular, when they are provided
 with information about competitors' performance. Empirical studies lead
 to the additional hypothesis that a competitor orientation is detrimental to
 performance. To examine these hypotheses, the authors conduct two
 studies. The first is a laboratory study in which 1016 subjects made pric-
 ing decisions. When information about the competitor's profits was pro-
 vided, over 40% of the subjects were willing to sacrifice part of their com-
 pany's profits to beat or harm the competitor. Such competitor-oriented
 behavior occurred across a variety of treatments. The second is a field
 study used to examine the performance over a half-century of 20 large
 U.S. firms with differing objectives. Firms with competitor-oriented (mar-
 ket share) objectives were less profitable and less likely to survive than
 those whose objectives were directly oriented to profits.
 Competitor Orientation: Effects of Objectives
 and Information on Managerial Decisions
 and Profitability
 Traditional economic theory calls for firms to maximize
 shareholder wealth. However, managers often do not explic-
 itly pursue the maximization of profits (Mueller 1992).
 Instead, they frequently make decisions so as to perform
 well relative to their competitors, which we refer to as hav-
 ing competitor-oriented objectives. Managers might choose
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 not to focus on maximizing future profits, because profits
 are difficult to forecast or because a focus on profits may
 lead to a short-term orientation at the expense of long-term
 considerations. Because it is difficult to determine how
 close a firm is to "maximum profits," managers may worry
 that using such a measure could make them or their organi-
 zations content with mediocre performance.
 Some experts argue that if profits do not motivate man-
 agers effectively, relative measures, such as market share,
 should be used. Kotler (1988, p. 333) states that the strate-
 gic objective of many firms "is to increase their market
 shares, thinking that this will lead to greater profitability."
 Compared with profit maximizing, such competitor-orient-
 ed objectives may be more visible because the performance
 of another firm serves as a benchmark. In the face of an
 uncertain future, market share can serve as an intermediate
 goal that positions the firm for long-term profitability.
 Competitor-oriented objectives are advocated in text-
 books, magazines, and journals. For example, Hendon
 (1986, p. 1) stresses beating competitors at the expense of
 all other objectives, including profit maximization. He states
 that "Business is war!... It is a zero sum game.... Military
 people want to destroy a target; business executives want to
 eliminate a competitor." Parks, Pharr, and Lockeman (1994,
 p. 68) say, "Just as in war, the reality of market-share battles
 188
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 is that the success of the victor depends upon the failure of
 the loser."
 Over the past half-century, improvements in information
 systems have made competitor-oriented information-such
 as market share-more timely, accurate, detailed, and cost-
 effective, thus making it easier to pursue competitor-orient-
 ed objectives. One recent development is the use of scanner
 data. Some experts, for example, consider that the goal of
 using scanner data is to "take market share away from the
 other guy."l
 We examine how competitor-oriented objectives and the
 availability of competitor-oriented information can affect
 managerial decisions and the profitability of firms. Using a
 variety of evidence collected over nine years, we compare
 the long-term profitability of competitor-oriented and self-
 oriented objectives.
 Students'and Managers'Beliefs About
 Competitor-Oriented Objectives
 Textbooks and experts advocate the use of competitor-ori-
 ented objectives-but this would not matter if their advice
 were ignored. To determine whether these views are held by
 faculty, students, and managers, we conducted a series of
 convenience surveys.
 In surveys of marketing faculty and students in 1992, we
 asked: "What do you believe would be the effects on long-
 term profitability if a firm has as its primary goal to achieve
 higher market share?"2 Of the 102 respondents, 57%
 believed that profits would be higher, 27% believed that
 they would be lower, and 16% were undecided.
 Between 1989 and 1994, we asked 170 Masters of
 Business Administration (MBA) students whether "the pri-
 mary purpose of the firm is (a) to do better than its com-
 petitors, or (b) to do the best that it can." One-third of these
 students believed that the primary purpose of the firm is to
 do better than its competitors. About the same number
 agreed with the statement that "the best way to judge the
 success of a firm is by how well it does relative to its com-
 petitors." In early 1995, we asked the same questions of 54
 students at a university in Korea; 39% and 41%, respective-
 ly, agreed with these statements.3
 Many managers believe that their firms use competitor-
 oriented objectives. In 1993, we surveyed 72 managers from
 a variety of firms who were attending seminars in
 Cleveland, Buenos Aires, and Santiago. Half of the respon-
 dents agreed that "the primary purpose of our firm is to be
 better than its competitors." Thirty-nine percent agreed that
 "the best way to judge the success of our firm is by how well
 it does relative to our competitors."
 To examine further whether managers use competitor-ori-
 ented objectives, we examined Japan, where experts (e.g.,
 Abegglen and Stalk 1985) claim that competitor-oriented
 objectives are common. Only 29% of senior executives from
 IStated by James Andress, president of Information Resources in a
 speech at the Wharton School in 1992.
 2Respondents were marketing faculty and students at the European
 Marketing Association Conference in Aarhus, Denmark (n = 13), the
 University of Auckland (n = 12), the University of Canterbury (n = 53),
 and the University of Otago (n = 24).
 3Wujin Chu collected these survey responses.
 Japanese companies (n = 21) said that the primary purpose
 of their firms is to be better than their competitors, and 48%
 judged their success by how well they do relative to their
 competitors.4
 It appears, then, that many business professors, students,
 and managers believe that a competitor orientation is desir-
 able and will enhance firm performance. This suggests that
 there are at least two competing viewpoints about the objec-
 tives of firms. The first is that managers should pursue prof-
 its as directly as possible, and the second is that managers
 should use competitor-oriented objectives (such as market
 share) as a path to long-term profits. In the subsequent sec-
 tion, we discuss our hypotheses and related research.
 HYPOTHESES AND RELATED RESEARCH
 Studies using decisions in simple games suggest that
 some people adopt competitor-oriented objectives.
 Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) summarized research from
 three such studies. The share of people that selected com-
 petitor-oriented responses ranged from 21% to 49%,
 depending on game instructions and payoffs. Liebrand and
 van Run (1985) found similar results across cultures.
 Griesinger and Livingston (1973) concluded from a
 review of experimental game literature that the proportion
 of "competitive" subjects varies depending on personality,
 cultural factors, and situational factors, such as feedback
 and game instructions. They also concluded (p. 187) that
 many subjects "seemed eager to know what was expected of
 them in order that they might adopt an appropriate orienta-
 tion to the game." For example, the results from laboratory
 studies by Deutsch (1958, 1960) imply that explicit support
 for competitor-oriented objectives has a strong effect.
 We hypothesized that under certain conditions some man-
 agers adopt competitor-oriented objectives. We further
 hypothesized that when competitor-oriented objectives are
 adopted, profits are reduced. Note that these hypotheses deal
 with objectives, not strategies. It seems reasonable that deci-
 sion makers should consider competitors' actions when
 developing strategies. For example, it might be useful to
 examine competitors' actions for ideas about design, price,
 and service. Also, managers should probably consider how
 competitors will react to their actions.
 Conditions Under Which Managers Adopt Competitor-
 Oriented Objectives
 Social comparison theory (Suls 1977) suggests that under
 some conditions, people judge their performance relative to
 others. We expect that certain identifiable conditions might
 lead managers to act competitively, such as when informa-
 tion about competitors is made available to them. Similarly,
 when managers use techniques that focus attention on their
 company's relative performance, they are more likely to
 seek to maximize the competitor-oriented measure of per-
 formance than the profits.
 Availability of competitor-oriented information. Dollar-
 auction studies demonstrate competitor-oriented behavior
 when one has direct knowledge about the competitor's
 response. Subjects bid for a dollar, with a rule that only the
 4Hotaka Katahira conducted this survey.
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 top bidder wins, but the top two bidders must pay. Final bids
 by each of the top bidders are usually well in excess of a dol-
 lar. The primary motivation of these bidders is to prevent
 their competitor from winning. These studies have been
 replicated in many countries (Teger 1980).
 The prisoner's dilemma has been widely used to examine
 decision making. Subjects can gain by defecting, but if both
 parties defect, they are worse off. In one such study,
 Corfman and Lehmann (1994) asked subjects to make
 "advertising spending decisions as marketing managers of a
 medium-sized manufacturer selling in mature markets" and
 to assume they were committed to remaining with the com-
 pany for five years. The advertising decision involved high
 (competitive) or low (cooperative) budgets, and their 57
 subjects chose high 78% of the time. Griffith and Rust
 (1994) compared the performance of subjects (MBA stu-
 dents) against normative pricing algorithms; their decision
 makers appeared to emphasize relative performance against
 competitors, even when they were explicitly instructed to
 maximize profits and their monetary compensation was
 based solely on profits.
 One of the difficulties in assessing whether subjects are
 employing competitor-oriented objectives is that the desire
 to improve profit might explain some of the results. By
 revising the prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix, it is possible
 to remove the profit motive as an explanation. Scodel and
 colleagues (1959) used a matrix in which the payoff to a
 player does not vary when the other subject is cooperative.
 Each cell shows Player One's score followed by Player
 Two's:
 Player Two
 Player One
 Black
 Red
 Black
 3,3
 3,1
 Red
 1,3
 0,0
 Assume that players were profit maximizers. Player One
 would select black if he expected Player Two to select red,
 because he would earn one point rather than zero. He would
 be indifferent if he thought that Player Two would select
 black, earning 3 points either way. The matrix is symmetri-
 cal, so neither player should prefer red in either condition.
 Interestingly, the proportion of red-red decisions exceeded
 black-black for 20 of the 22 pairs of subjects tested by
 Scodel and colleagues (1959) in a multiperiod experiment.
 In terms of profit maximizing, this behavior is irrational; it
 is rational, however, if the players have competitor-oriented
 objectives-only by selecting red does a player have a
 chance of doing better than the competitor.
 Messick and Thomgate (1967) examined a payoff matrix
 in which subjects would lose money by making competitive
 decisions if the other player were cooperative:
 Player Two
 Player One
 Black
 Red
 Black
 8,8
 2,1
 Red
 1,2
 5,5
 Subjects were instructed "to earn as much money for them-
 selves as possible," and a monetary payoff, based on the
 number of points scored, was provided. The highest payoff
 comes when both play black. However, only by choosing
 red can one player do better than the other. When provided
 with feedback only on their own earnings, about one-third
 selected red, the competitive decision. When given feedback
 about other players' gains as well, most subjects selected
 red; on their last 20 decisions, almost 90 percent of these
 subjects' choices were red.
 These findings about the impact of competitive informa-
 tion in two-player games are robust. Messick and Thomgate
 (1967) and Messick and McClintock (1968) examined vari-
 ations of the preceding payoff matrix. They concluded that
 subjects primarily wanted to avoid decisions in which their
 earnings might be less than their competitor's. Messick and
 McClintock (1968, p. 23) also concluded that "subjects
 receiving relative-score information played to maximize the
 difference between their own and other player's scores more
 frequently than subjects given only [their] own ... scores."
 In a quasi-experiment involving food stores in four U.S.
 cities, Boynton, Blake, and Uhl (1983) found that the publi-
 cation of average food prices at various stores had little
 impact on consumer behavior. But it did lead stores to
 respond to one another such that the average prices dropped
 by approximately two percent. As a result, this competitive
 information reduced profits. Leeflang and Wittink (1996), in
 a study of seven large brands of a nondurable, nonfood
 products sold in the Netherlands, concluded that managers
 overreacted to each other's promotional activities. In a repli-
 cation in New Zealand of the Leeflang and Wittink study,
 Brodie and Bonfrer (1996) found even stronger evidence
 that managers were too competitor oriented.
 Application of competitor-oriented techniques. Many
 management techniques focus attention on market share.
 For example, portfolio planning methods examine perfor-
 mance relative to the competitors'. Use of these methods
 seems to be detrimental to profits. In laboratory experiments
 with 1015 subjects, Armstrong and Brodie (1994) found that
 use of the Boston Consulting Group matrix as a decision aid
 substantially reduces the profitability of subjects' decisions.
 Slater and Zwirlein (1992) concluded from a study of 129
 firms that those whose strategies are consistent with portfo-
 lio planning models have lower returns to shareholders.
 Capon, Farley, and Hulbert (1987, pp. 316-17) found that
 firms that use the Boston Consulting Group portfolio matrix
 methods report a lower return on capital than those not using
 them.
 Effects of Competitor-Oriented Objectives on Performance
 It is well established that objectives affect performance
 (Locke and Latham 1990). In particular, objectives have a
 strong effect when they are made explicit. These findings
 apply to groups as well as to individuals (O'Leary-Kelly,
 Martocchio, and Frink 1994).
 When discussing the effects of a competitor orientation
 on performance, people often generalize from sports, war,
 and other areas. Yet, their conclusions may be suspect even
 in those areas. Kohn's (1986) review of competition con-
 tains 388 references drawn from a variety of areas, such as
 sports, education, and the performing arts (but not from
 business). He concluded that though there may be condi-
 tions under which competitor-oriented objectives improve
 performance, in general, they do not.
 Campbell and Furrer (1995), in an experiment involving
 the solution of routine arithmetic problems, concluded that
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 competition had "a significant dysfunctional effect on task
 performance." In Deutsch's (1958, 1960) studies, when par-
 ticipants were told to do better than their opponents, both
 parties ended up worse off than when told to do the best they
 could for themselves.
 Market share is often used as a relative measure of per-
 formance, and it may be a surrogate for the measure of true
 interest, namely, long-term profit. Because it does not
 directly assess what is of interest, there is a potential for
 other factors to intervene, causing it to give a less accurate
 representation of the effects on profits. Moreover, basing
 decisions on attaining market share can have harmful
 effects, such as price wars. Cassady, who examined actual
 price wars, concluded that, in some situations, "vendors
 temporarily shift their emphasis away from attaining suc-
 cess [for themselves] and toward preventing the success of
 rivals" (summarized by Teger 1980). Similarly, Anterasian
 and Graham (1989) found that detrimental performance
 resulted from competitor-oriented objectives. They used a
 simulation of firms to compare a self-oriented goal (stabili-
 ty) against a competitor-oriented goal (market share). The
 market share goal reduced profits when the market had
 cycles.
 Szymanski, Bharadwaj, and Varadarajan (1993) conduct-
 ed a metanalysis of studies relating market share and prof-
 itability. These cross-sectional studies showed positive cor-
 relations between market share and profitability. Many
 observers have concluded that this relationship is causal,
 though others (e.g., Jacobson and Aaker 1985; Prescott,
 Kohli and Venkatraman 1986) disagree. For example, firms
 with profits as their sole objective might produce superior
 products and, as a result, achieve gains in both market share
 and profits. Moreover, and of critical importance to the
 issues raised here, these studies did not examine the objec-
 tives of the managers.
 Studies that have used a longitudinal, rather than cross-
 sectional, approach have found a negative relationship
 between market share and profits. Anterasian and Graham
 (1989) analyzed data on 42 firms in industries that had
 cycles; companies that lost market share during growth peri-
 ods tended to be more profitable over the cycle than firms in
 the same industry that gained market share. Tschoegl and Yu
 (1990), in a study of the liquor market, found that a high
 market share did not help in gaining further share and did
 not produce stability in the firm's sales. Montgomery and
 Wernerfelt (1991) examined the performance of six large
 U.S. brewers from 1969 to 1979, a period characterized by
 large changes in market share; using returns on stocks, they
 concluded (p. 958) that gains in market share were associat-
 ed with "the destruction, rather than the creation, of firm
 value."
 LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS
 We conducted laboratory experiments to examine
 whether managers make competitor-oriented decisions even
 when they know in advance that such decisions are harmful
 to profits. The decisions of subjects who were given infor-
 mation only on their own firm's profits were compared with
 those of subjects who also were given information on their
 competitor's profits.
 Administration
 In the subsequent discussion, a "treatment" refers to the
 description provided to the subjects (e.g., "harm" or "beat").
 These treatments were used to examine alternative explana-
 tions. Treatments were randomly assigned, and each subject
 received only one. An "administration" refers to the treat-
 ments tested at a given time. Some administrations had few
 subjects, so few treatments were used. After making their
 decisions, subjects responded to written follow-up questions
 about reasons for their decisions. Most administrations were
 concluded with a debriefing of the subjects.
 Subjects
 Managers or potential managers were sought as subjects.
 The subjects (n = 1016) came from two major business
 schools in the United States (73 undergraduates, 846 MBAs,
 42 executive MBAs) and from a business school in
 Argentina (20 MBAs, 35 executive MBAs).
 The subjects were familiar with the type of problem pre-
 sented, through either academic training or work experi-
 ence. Almost all had full-time work experience, and their
 managerial experience was extensive. The experiments were
 conducted in classroom settings, and the subjects worked
 individually. This use of captive subjects reduced self-selec-
 tion bias.
 Materials
 Subjects were asked to assume the role of a marketing
 manager for a company called Big Guys, Inc. (To avoid
 associations with actual firms, names that sounded obvious-
 ly fictitious were used.) Subjects were told, "We are per-
 forming an experiment in decision-making and we need
 your help.... You will only need about 10 or 15 minutes to
 complete the experiment."
 The subjects received written descriptions of a business
 situation that was more extreme than might be encountered
 in the real world. The decision involved a choice of a "high"
 or "low" price for a new product. Five-year profit forecasts
 were provided for each pricing decision. Our intent was to
 convey uncertainty about profits after the stated planning
 horizon. A base treatment made no mention of competitors:
 You are the marketing manager of a manufacturing firm
 known as Big Guys, Inc. As the company's marketing
 manager, you are responsible for all marketing deci-
 sions and strategies, including the pricing structure of
 the firm's products. Recently your company introduced
 a new highly technical product, and you have been
 asked to set the pricing strategy for this product. You
 calculate the present value of the total profits expected
 for your firm over the next five years. You determine
 the following results for both strategies:
 Expected Profits Over Five Years
 Low-Price Strategy
 $40 million
 High-Price Strategy
 $80 million
 The harm and beat treatments added information about the
 impact of the subjects' decisions on competitors.
 Harm treatment. In this treatment, subjects were able to
 harm their competitors. Subjects were told that their main
 competitor had a similar product and that the market for
 191
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 both products was the same. The following was added to
 their description:
 You are aware that your main competitor, Other Guys,
 Inc., intends to introduce a product that is very similar
 to the one that your firm has just introduced. You should
 assume that the competitor's product is as good as yours
 in every way that is important to the market, and the
 market is the same for both products. Therefore, the
 pricing strategy which you must formulate for your
 product should take into account this competitive force.
 You are essentially faced with two choices:
 1. Keep your price low, which causes your competition
 to suffer a substantial loss, or
 2. Choose a higher price that produces higher profits for
 your firm, but which also allows the competition to
 prosper.
 You then calculate the present value of the total profits
 expected for your firm over the next five years, as well
 as for the competitors (Other Guys). You note that after
 five years the products are in the mature stage of the
 product life cycle. You determine the following results
 for the two strategies:
 Expected Profits Over Five Years
 Big Guys
 Other Guys
 Low-Price Strategy
 $ 40 million
 -100 million
 High-Price Strategy
 $80 million
 40 million
 Subjects could earn $140 million more than competitors by
 choosing the low price, but only $40 million more by choos-
 ing the high price. In terms of relative gains, then, the low
 price is best.
 Beat treatment. Because the harm treatment inflicts heavy
 losses, subjects might infer that this leads to the demise of
 the competitor and discourages future entry. If some sub-
 jects were simply making judgments they believed would
 lead to long-term profits, then the elimination of this dam-
 age to the competitor might reduce the number making this
 choice. The beat treatment addresses this.
 The description was similar to the harm treatment.
 Outcomes for the subject's firm were the same as in the
 harm treatment, but the competitor's profits were $120 mil-
 lion higher for each alternative. At the low price, the sub-
 jects' firm earns $20 million more in profits than the com-
 petitor, but the competitor apparently operates successfully.
 Profits are higher for the high-price decision, but here the
 competitor earns more than the subject's firm. Thus, only by
 choosing the lower price can the subject do better than the
 competitor, whereas in the harm treatment the firm would
 "win" with either strategy.
 Expected Profits Over Five Years
 Big Guys
 Other Guys
 Low-Price Strategy
 $40 million
 20 million
 High-Price Strategy
 $ 80 million
 160 million
 Face Validity of the Instruments
 To assess whether the situations allowed for profit maxi-
 mization, they were presented to economics and finance
 professors at a major university suggested by the chair of the
 economics department on the basis of relevant experience.
 Each faculty member received the harm and beat trea.ments
 and was asked to assume that he (all faculty members were
 male) had been called in as an economic advisor to the firm.
 Six faculty members responded, and all agreed that the high
 price was the profit-maximizing decision for each treatment;
 when asked, they expressed no need for further information.
 Base Results
 When no information was provided about the perfor-
 mance of competitors, 14% of 65 subjects selected the less
 profitable decision. On the follow-up questionnaire, some
 subjects who had selected the low price expressed concern
 about their competitors.
 In the harm treatment, 34% of the 139 subjects selected
 the less profitable decision. Thus, here subjects were twice
 as likely to select the less profitable decision as when no
 information was provided about competitors (Z = 2.66;
 p< .01).
 In the beat treatment, 60% of the 60 subjects selected the
 low price. Testing against the null hypothesis that the infor-
 mation about competitor's performance had no effect (the
 beat treatment versus the base treatment with no information
 about competitors) produced a significant rejection (Z =
 5.86; p < .01).
 Replications with Extensions
 To assess reliability and address threats to validity, 23 dif-
 ferent treatments using 43 experimental administrations
 were conducted from 1986 to early 1995. One concern in
 these extensions was to assess the alternative explanation
 that subjects selected the low-price decision so as to maxi-
 mize long-term profits. These extensions involved treat-
 ments that lengthened the time horizon, changed the situa-
 tion from the future to the past, and equalized the final mar-
 ket values.5
 Lengthening time horizon. Because subjects might be
 willing to suffer short-term losses in exchange for long-term
 gains, the time horizon was lengthened from 5 to 20 years
 for the harm and beat treatments.6 Subjects were told that
 the matrix represented net present values of profits over a
 20-year period. For the 42 subjects who did not receive
 information about the performance of their competitor in the
 pricing treatment, 12% made the less profitable decision. In
 contrast, 45% of the 40 harm treatment subjects and 30% of
 the 40 beat treatment subjects selected the less profitable
 decision. The difference between the subjects with and
 without information on competitors was significant for both
 the harm (Z = 3.02; p < .01) and beat treatments (Z = 1.65;
 p < .05). Lengthening the horizon had little effect on results
 5Minor extensions examined the nature of the product. The problem was
 initially described as involving a "new, highly technical product." To assess
 whether the type of product made a difference, the product was varied in
 treatments that did not mention competitors. One treatment, administered
 to 15 subjects, specified no product; here, only one subject chose the less
 profitable decision. Another treatment said that the product was "a new per-
 fume for women"; three of 17 subjects chose the less profitable decision.
 For these two treatments, then, 12.5% of the 32 subjects chose the less prof-
 itable product. This is similar to the 13.3% of the 75 subjects who had
 received the technical product treatment. We concluded that the type of
 product did not have an important effect and have combined all these
 results in the analysis of the base treatment.
 6This change was also made for the ex post pricing decisions that are
 described in the next section.
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 in the harm treatment, but it reduced the percentage choos-
 ing the low-price strategy in the beat treatment; we have no
 explanation for this result.
 Ex post pricing decision. Despite the instructions, sub-
 jects might have made different assumptions about profits
 beyond the stated planning horizon. To control for this, the
 problem was changed to refer to the past. Here, subjects had
 to decide which of two brand managers should be promoted
 by the company, called Multiple Products, Inc. In this "ex
 post pricing decision," the choices were between a manager
 who used a high-price strategy and one who used a low-
 price strategy. Both had managed in comparable but inde-
 pendent geographical regions for the same five years. The
 profit matrix was identical with that in the original harm
 pricing decision: The manager choosing the high price
 earned high profits and his competitor also earned high prof-
 its, whereas the manager choosing the low price earned
 lower profits and his competitor's profits were negative. The
 description stated that "whatever their profit situation has
 been over the past five years, all of the competitors still exist
 in their respective regions."
 Of the 76 subjects in the ex post harm pricing treatment,
 40% promoted the marketing manager who used the low
 price. Of the 127 subjects in these same administrations who
 had received the basic harm pricing treatment, 34% selected
 the less profitable decision. Thus, these results are not con-
 sistent with a hypothesis that the subjects were trying to
 increase long-term profits.
 Similarly, of the 69 subjects in an ex post beat treatment,
 51 % promoted the manager who used the low-price strate-
 gy. This is comparable to the 60% of the subjects who
 selected the low-profit decision in the basic beat treatment
 in the same administrations.
 Equalizing final market values. A further revision of the
 ex post pricing treatments added information that the final
 market values of the company's two divisions were the
 same:
 Currently, the firm has a cash flow shortage. Over the
 past seven years the firm has maintained its dividend
 payout in the face of declining profits, such that all
 profits have been paid out. As a result, the firm has
 decided to sell one, but not both, divisions. In trying to
 decide which division to sell, both were put on the mar-
 ket. Bidding has been intense and the selling price for
 each division is almost identical. These have been good
 divisions for the company. They had been acquired ten
 years ago and the purchase price for each was 40% of
 the current market price. Marketing for the two divi-
 sions are headed by Harry Jones and Louie Smith. You
 must decide whether to retain Harry or Louie for the
 division that the company will keep.
 In other words, the two divisions were valued equally ini-
 tially and also currently, but the manager who used the high
 price achieved much higher profits during the intervening
 period.
 Of the 87 subjects receiving the equal-market-value harm
 treatment, 52% promoted the manager who had the lower
 profits. Surprisingly, this exceeded the 34% of such promo-
 tions by the 80 subjects in the equal-market-value beat
 then, 43% of the 167 subjects selected the competitor-ori-
 ented (less profitable) option.
 Exposure to Competitor-Oriented Techniques
 We anticipated that competitiveness would intensify
 when people were exposed to techniques that advocate com-
 petitor-oriented objectives. To test this, some subjects were
 provided with a description of the experience curve, which
 states that reductions in unit costs occur as cumulative vol-
 ume increases. The experience curve strategy advises firms
 to cut prices to build volume, in order to propel the firm
 down its cost curve faster than competitors can move down
 theirs. In other words, they should price so as to prevent
 competitors from catching up. Lieberman (1987, p. 451)
 concluded that the experience curve produces incentives
 that "often intensify competition and reduce profits."
 To assess the impact of exposure to the experience curve,
 some subjects received a description from Kiechel (1981,
 pp. 139-140) advocating its use. The decisions of those 97
 subjects were compared with those from 137 control sub-
 jects in the same administrations; the latter received no
 information about the experience curve. More experience
 curve subjects selected the less profitable decision than did
 control subjects (59% versus 45%; p < .05 using chi-
 square).
 A neutral description of the experience curve from Porter
 (1980) was provided to another set of subjects. Of the 63
 subjects receiving this description, 41% selected the less
 profitable decision, and 42% of the 86 control subjects
 selected it. By this test, the neutral description of the expe-
 rience curve had no significant effect.
 In a before-and-after design, 113 subjects made decisions
 before reading the neutral description of the experience
 curve. Then they read it and made a second decision. Nine
 subjects changed from a high to a low price decision, and
 none went in the other direction. The percentage who chose
 the lower-profit choice went from 43% to 51%. This was a
 modest but statistically significant increase (p < .05 based
 on the McNemar change test with correction for continuity
 from Siegel and Castellan 1988).
 Overall, then, information about the experience curve
 produced less profitable decisions for two tests, with no dif-
 ference on one. This provides moderate support for our
 hypothesis.
 Management Training
 Management training often emphasizes competing. For
 subjects from one of the U.S. business schools, decisions
 made by those who had more formal management education
 were compared with decisions by subjects who had less.
 Subjects just entering the management program were placed
 in a "low" group, those who had had courses in strategic
 planning were put in a "high" group, and the rest were
 placed in an "intermediate" group. This classification was
 rough, because subjects within each group differed with
 respect to their prior management education and the treat-
 ments were not balanced across education levels.
 Furthermore, the competitor orientation was probably high
 treatment. Given complete information about profitability,
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 These shortcomings should reduce the estimated effect of
 education on decisions.
 Using decisions by subjects in the harm and beat treat-
 ments, education levels were compared. Of the 236 subjects
 in the low education group, 38% selected the less profitable
 decision. In contrast, 46% of the 227 subjects in the inter-
 mediate education group and 55% of the 88 subjects in the
 high education group chose the less profitable decision. The
 differences among groups were statistically significant (p <
 .05 using chi-square). In effect then, those with more man-
 agement education made less profitable decisions.
 Follow-Up Questionnaire
 In follow-up questionnaires from 14 administrations of
 the experiment, subjects were asked, "Why did you make
 this decision?" In general, once subjects took the competi-
 tor's performance into account, they were less likely to pay
 attention to their own profits. Eighty-three percent of the
 107 subjects who mentioned competitors selected the less
 profitable decision.
 Sixty-seven percent of the 133 subjects who selected the
 low-price decision made statements about beating their
 competitors, while only 38% discussed profits. Some of
 those selecting the low price said that the company's objec-
 tive was to increase market share, that it was important to
 beat competitors, or that they wanted to be the leader. Some
 respondents commented on their willingness to sacrifice
 profits. One respondent who had been employed by an inter-
 national consulting firm stated, "Perhaps it's my strategic
 planning background, but I would definitely pay to harm my
 competitors." Another subject who selected the less prof-
 itable decision said, "Louie's strategy [low price, competi-
 tor-oriented] has generated twice the profits of the competi-
 tor, while Harry's strategy [high price] has reaped half the
 profits of the competitor. Hence, Louie's strategy seems to
 be the strongest. Destroy the competitor."
 Of the 208 subjects selecting the high-price decision, 78%
 explicitly discussed profits, while fewer than 10% men-
 tioned competitors. Of the latter, most said that they did not
 want to harm their competitor. Some said that they were
 pleased that their competitor would also succeed ("a win-
 win situation"). Others stated that the competitor's perfor-
 mance was not relevant to their decision.
 Limitations and Threats to Validity of the
 Laboratory Studies
 The use of students as subjects posed few threats to the
 studies' validity. Prior research, summarized by Ashton and
 Kramer (1980), found similarity between students and non-
 students in studies of decision making, which is the concern
 of our study. Also, consistent with criteria suggested in
 Gordon, Slade, and Schmitt (1987), our subjects were simi-
 lar to the population of interest. Corfman and Lehmann
 (1994) found no substantial differences between executives
 and students in their prisoner's dilemma study of advertising
 decisions.
 Results from the experience curve treatment might be due
 to demand effects. Providing information about the experi-
 ence curve might have led subjects to assume that it was a
 relevant technique, but it is difficult to use demand effects to
 Table 1
 PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS WHO SELECTED THE
 LESS PROFITABLE DECISION
 (NUMBER OF SUBJECTS)
 Information About Competitors
 Treatment None Harm Beat
 Pricing:
 5 years (benchmark) 14 (65) 34 (139)** 60 (60)**
 20 years 12 (42) 45 (40)** 30 (40)*
 Unweighted Averages 13 40 45
 Ex Post Pricing:
 5 years n.a.t 40 (76) 51 (69)
 20 years n.a. 25 (24) 30 (30)
 5 years: equal value n.a. 52 (87) 34 (80)
 Unweighted Averages 39 38
 *Significant at p < .05 with one-tail t-tests (compared with results from
 "none" column).
 **Significant at p < .01.
 tNo tests could be conducted for the ex post treatments, because we
 could not construct a "no information" version.
 explain the differences in decisions across levels of educa-
 tion. In the other parts of the experiments, we had no reason
 to expect demand effects. We did consider the possibility
 that subjects might answer so as to look good to the experi-
 menter (Sigall, Aronson, and van House 1970). To do this
 successfully, they would have had to be aware of the pur-
 pose of the study. Follow-up discussions with subjects
 revealed some awareness. When 84 of them were asked to
 guess the purpose, ten (12%) guessed correctly. Only a
 small percentage, then, would have known how to modify
 their responses to look good in this situation. Nevertheless,
 this does not rule out demand effects (Shimp, Hyatt, and
 Snyder 1991).
 Although researchers in management have become
 increasingly critical of the external validity of laboratory
 studies (Griffin and Kacmar 1991), evidence suggests that
 their validity is comparable to that of field experiments
 (Locke 1986).
 Summary of Laboratory Results
 The results, summarized in Table 1, were consistent with
 our hypotheses, the effects were strong, and they were sta-
 tistically significant: A substantial portion of the subjects
 selected competitor-oriented decisions. This provides evi-
 dence of economically irrational behavior.
 FIELD STUDY
 Historical performance of American industrial firms
 between 1938 and 1994 was used to determine the extent to
 which a competitor orientation can affect profitability. To
 assess what marketing experts would expect from such a
 study, we posed the following question to convenience sam-
 ples of 90 marketing faculty members in New Zealand and
 the United States, as well as to 18 managers in Buenos
 Aires:
 What if we ran the following study: (1) select 20 firms
 from different industries; (2) assess the extent to which
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 their goals are competitor oriented (market share); and
 (3) examine their profits over the next three decades.
 Assuming that the 20 firms would differ greatly with
 respect to competitor orientation, what would you
 predict?
 The key item was: "Profits in firms with market share as a
 primary goal are (1) much less, (2) less, (3) the same, (4)
 more, or (5) much more than in firms with profit-oriented
 goals." Of the 108 respondents, 52% said that profits would
 be more or much more, and 26% thought they would be less
 or much less.
 Information about firms' competitor orientations and their
 long-term profitability was needed to test the relationship.
 Fortunately, information on pricing objectives of 20 large
 U.S. companies had been collected by Lanzillotti (1958),
 who, sponsored by the Brookings Institution, investigated
 the price-setting process. He examined "the motivational
 hypothesis of the firm, i.e., the specific objectives upon
 which business firms base pricing decisions."
 Competitor Orientation of 20 Firms
 The 20 corporations, drawn from a variety of industries,
 were among the 200 largest U.S. industrial corporations in
 terms of assets. According to Lanzillotti (1958, p. 921-22),
 "The companies were selected from among the largest cor-
 porations on the basis of the willingness of management to
 cooperate by permitting extensive interviews with top com-
 pany officials," and because "the prominence of each of the
 corporations in their respective industries made them mas-
 ters, to a significant degree, of their fates; hence they were
 able to adjust pricing to the company's general goal."
 The competitor orientation of the firms' objectives was
 inferred from Lanzillotti's description of their stated pricing
 policies. Between 1948 and 1951, he conducted interviews
 with company officials that lasted approximately one week
 in each company. Lanzillotti (1958) explained that such a
 careful procedure was needed because of the sensitive
 nature of pricing policies. A second set of interviews was
 carried out in 1956-1957 to fill gaps in the study and deter-
 mine whether changes had occurred in pricing policies since
 the original interviews (Kaplan, Dirlam, and Lanzillotti
 1958). Judging from Kaplan, Dirlam, and Lanzillotti's (p.
 187) study, the competitor orientations were stable from the
 initial interviews to the follow-up interviews, a period of
 nine years. They also said that, in some firms, objectives
 were based on long-standing policies. For example, as far
 back as 1937, A&P had stated that their primary aim in pric-
 ing was to achieve a larger market share.
 An 11 I-point scale (I = to do well for themselves; 11 = to
 do well relative to competitors) was developed to assess
 firms' objectives. The objective of doing well for a person's
 own firm was identified by the presence of an explicitly stat-
 ed pricing goal to maximize or increase profits. When prof-
 it targets were stated, a distinction was made between high
 and modest objectives. A priori, we classified a target as
 "high" if it called for maximizing profits or if it had a target
 return on investment (ROI) of at least 15% after taxes. At
 the other end of the scale were competitor-oriented objec-
 tives, stated in terms of market share. Goals of increasing or
 maximizing market share were classified as highly competi-
 Table 2
 OBJECTIVES SCALE AND NUMBER OF FIRMS AT EACH LEVEL
 Competitor Pricing Objectives
 Orientation Number
 I = low of
 11 = high Primary Secondary Firms
 I High Profit* n.s.t 3
 2 Profit n.s. 1
 3 Stability n.s. 1
 4 High Profit Maintain MS 2
 5 High Profit Increase MS 0
 6 Profit Maintain MS 4
 7 Profit Increase MS 0
 8 Maintain MS Profit 2
 9 Increase MS Profit I
 10 Maintain MS n.s. 4
 11 Increase MS n.s. 2
 *High profit means a return of investment of at least 15% after taxes;
 MS = market share.
 tn.s. = "none stated."
 tor oriented, and goals of maintaining market share were
 moderately competitor oriented. Upper limits on market
 share (e.g., to stay under 20%) were not coded as competi-
 tor oriented. Lanzillotti (1958) described "primary pricing
 goals," which were used to make basic category assign-
 ments, and "collateral pricing goals" (see Table 2). One firm
 did not specify objectives in terms of market share or prof-
 its, but focused on stability of operations. To handle this, an
 additional category was created between goals that focused
 only on profit and those that focused on market share.
 Firms' orientations were coded by the first author and an
 expert on competitor-oriented behavior (Peter S. Fader). The
 latter received Lanzillotti's article (from which information
 about profitability and market share had been deleted) along
 with a copy of the rating scales. Intercoder reliability was
 high (r = .96); minor differences occurred for orientations
 of only four firms. Differences resulted from failures to
 describe how to handle an upper limit on market share and
 from the interpretation of Lanzillotti's description. After dis-
 cussion, but before analyzing relationships, each coder
 changed two items; this produced full agreement.
 Firms were located at all levels of the scale except 5 and
 7. The median firm's orientation was 6, the scale's midpoint.
 Competitor-oriented objectives were adapted by 30%, and
 an additional 45% used a combination of profit- and com-
 petitor-oriented objectives.
 Performance of the 20 Firms
 Our hypothesis states that a competitor orientation harms
 the firm's profit; it makes no prediction about relative per-
 formance. Thus, the company's profits were examined in
 absolute terms, not in comparison with others in the same
 industry. Specifically, the average after-tax ROI was used.
 Lanzillotti (1958) provided these data over nine years
 (1947-1955) because, in his opinion, they measured perfor-
 mance that might have been affected by the pricing policies.
 Return on investment was "net income to surplus" (after
 taxes) divided by the firm's "total assets." Restated earnings
 were used when available. To guard against errors, two
 research assistants independently collected the data, and the
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 Table 3
 COMPETITOR ORIENTATION OF FIRMS AND ROI FOR NINE-YEAR PERIODS
 Competitor
 Orientation ROI (After Taxes)
 I = low;
 Firm 11 = high 1938-1946 1947-1955 1956-1964 1965-1973 1974-1982
 DuPont I 9.1 15.4 15.5 8.0 6.9
 General Electric 1 8.1 10.9 9.4 6.7 7.9
 Union Carbide 1 9.8 11.0 9.1 6.3 6.6
 Alcoa 2 8.5 6.4 4.2 4.2 5.5
 Kennecott 3 8.6 13.3 8.9 8.2 3.2d
 General Motors 4 8.8 16.6 13.2 12.0 6.3
 Johns Manville 4 6.8 11.2 4.6 7.6 4.9b
 Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxonc) 6 5.4 13.0 7.8 7.6 8.0
 General Foods 6 11.9 8.2 11.4 8.9 7.4
 US Steel (USXd) 6 3.4 6.5 6.0 3.5 3.4
 International Harvestere 6 4.7 6.7 4.6 4.0 -3.4
 Kroger 8 7.2 8.0 6.1 4.9 4.6
 Standard Oil of Indianaf 8 5.3 7.1 5.4 6.4 8.3
 Sears 9 8.8 12.4 8.5 6.4 4.2
 Goodyear 10 5.8 6.4 7.0 5.7 4.0
 ulfg 10 5.0 9.7 8.9 7.1 6.3
 American Canh 10 6.8 7.8 5.2 4.8 3.8
 Swift 10 3.9 4.6 2.4 3.3 n.a.
 Great Atlantic & Pacific 11 6.8 8.4 7.8 4.2 -2.9
 National Steel 11 5.2 9.6 6.0 5.1 1. IJ
 Correlation With
 Competitor Orientation -.54* -.43* -.37* -.43* -.45*
 *Correlations were significantly different from r = 0 at p < .05.
 aAcquired by Standard Oil of Ohio in July 1981 (1981-82 excluded).
 bSucceeded by Manville Corporation on October 30, 1981, when the firm filed for Chapter 11 (1982 excluded).
 CName changed in 1973.
 dName changed in 1986.
 eName changed to Navistar in 1986 and most assets were sold.
 fName changed to Amoco in 1985.
 gAcquired by Chevron in 1984.
 hBecame part of Primerica, an insurance and financial firm, in 1987.
 'Reorganized April 30, 1973, after which Swift consisted only of food divisions (1973 and subsequent years excluded).
 JReorganized as National Intergroup in 1982, and the steel operations were sold to Japan's NKK Corporation.
 first author checked a sample of firms.7 (Our figures for ROI
 for 1947-1955, obtained from Moody's Industrial Manual,
 were somewhat different from those reported by Lanzillotti
 and we were unable to identify why.8)
 Competitor-oriented objectives and ROIs were negative-
 ly correlated for the 1947-1955 data. The Spearman corre-
 lation (all reported correlations were corrected for ties) was
 rs = -.43, which was statistically different from the null
 hypothesis that competitor-oriented objectives are not relat-
 ed to the level of profitability (p = .03 using a one-tail test).
 Because many other factors also influence a firm's ROI,
 these results suggest a strong relationship.
 This analysis of profitability covered the period coinci-
 dent with Lanzillotti's assessment of pricing goals, and we
 also analyzed the nine years after this. In Table 3, we present
 the ROI for each firm for 1956-1964. The Spearman corre-
 lation between competitor-orientation and ROI remained
 negative (rs = -.37) and statistically significant (p = .05)-
 7Jennifer L. Armstrong, Michael Halperin, and Gina Bloom collected
 financial data for the field study.
 8Using Lanzillotti's data, the results would have been even stronger.
 that is, firms that had competitor-oriented objectives in the
 1950s continued to earn less on their investments.
 Advocates of competitor-oriented objectives suggest that
 gaining market share improves long-term profitability, so
 we analyzed additional nine-year periods (see Table 3). The
 ROIs for 1965-1973 were based on Moody' Industrial
 Manual and those for 1974-1982 on Compustat.9 As before,
 competitor-oriented objectives were inversely related to
 ROI-Spearman correlations were -.43 and -.45 respec-
 tively (both significant at p < .05).
 We also looked at survival rates of the 20 companies.
 Survival was defined here as avoiding bankruptcy or sale of
 the firm because of poor performance. Companies whose
 only goal was profit (those coded as 1 or 2 in Table 3) were
 compared against those with market share as their only goal
 (codings of 10 or 11). Information from Moody's Industrial
 9Compustat was used because it was available for 1974-1982, and it
 adjusted these data to aid comparability across companies, thereby aiding
 potential replication. The figures for Moody's and Compustat were identi-
 cal for about two-thirds of the entries for 1974-1982, and the differences
 were typically minor for the remaining o e-third. When the 1974-1984
 Moody's data were substituted, a Spearman correlation with competitor ori-
 entation of -.36 (significant at p = .06, one-tail test) was obtained.
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 Manual through 1994 was examined, a span of 36 years
 since Lanzillotti's paper. All four profit-oriented firms sur-
 vived, while four of the six competitor-oriented companies
 failed.10 Thus, competitor-oriented firms were less likely to
 survive (p = .07 by the Fisher Exact Test).
 Limitations of the Field Study
 A person might argue with Lanzillotti's statement that
 these firms were masters of their fate, suggesting that short-
 term conditions within the industry led firms to adopt com-
 petitor-oriented objectives. In particular, managers in firms
 that were doing poorly in the mid-1950s might have decid-
 ed at that time that they could improve by focusing on mar-
 ket share. To test this, we examined the prior nine-year peri-
 od (1938-1946; see Table 3). If a change in performance
 caused the change in orientation, there should be little cor-
 relation between competitor orientation and ROI in the ear-
 lier period. As it turned out, competitor orientation was neg-
 atively related to ROI (Spearman correlation = -.54;
 p < .02).
 Our analysis covered 54 years, and many changes
 occurred in the industries as well as in the firms. Of partic-
 ular concern is that objectives of some firms might have
 changed. Such changes would be expected to reduce the
 relationship that we hypothesized.11 Another change is that
 some of the firms, such as Alcoa and DuPont, have decen-
 tralized and allowed the strategic business units to set their
 own objectives. Finally, differences among firms might
 have been caused by some other factor that happened to be
 related to the selection of this group of firms, but we were
 unable to think of such a factor.
 DISCUSSION
 Our research strategy was one of triangulation: We pro-
 posed two hypotheses supported by prior research and then
 conducted a series of laboratory experiments and a field
 study.12 Several different measures and procedures were
 used, and these were established prior to analyzing the data.
 The studies utilized evidence from different cultures and
 different time periods. This multimethod, multimeasure
 strategy, articulated by Campbell and Fiske (1959), has been
 recommended where experiments with randomly selected
 subjects are difficult.
 I0Each of the failed firms experienced financial difficulties. As a result,
 Gulf was purchased by Chevron in 1985, American Can became Primerica
 in 1987 and abandoned the canning business, Swift reorganized with part
 becoming Esmark in 1973, and National Steel reorganized in 1983 under
 National Intergroup (a pharmaceutical company) and was bought by
 Japan's NKK Corporation.
 "IFor example, in December 1981, the Chief Executive Officer of
 General Electric (GE) publicly stated that GE's goal was to be number one
 or number two in each of its businesses (Slater 1993, pp. 73-76). This con-
 trasts with GE's profit orientation in our analysis. It should be noted that
 GE also made other significant changes (e.g., downsizing and decentraliza-
 tion). The ROI in the decade prior to these changes was 7.5%, whereas in
 the decade after it was 6.0%. Many other factors varied over these two
 decades.
 12We report on all but one of the studies that we undertook on this pro-
 ject. That study involved a comparison of managers' competitor orientation
 and the average market value of firms in a seven-year management game
 simulation. The results were consistent with our hypotheses (p < .10), but
 the test involved only four industries. Copies of these results are available
 to interested readers.
 What we find most striking, then, is the pattern of results.
 Although it is possible to provide alternative explanations
 for particular results, it is difficult to find an alternative that
 is consistent with the prior research and all our results.
 On the other hand, various limitations have been identi-
 fied in the previous research and our studies. Also, our
 results lack face validity among many experts. In addition,
 there may be conditions under which competitor-oriented
 objectives are useful. That noted, Slater and Narver (1994)
 examined whether the competitive environment might have
 an impact on the effectiveness of different corporate objec-
 tives, but they found none.
 Further studies should examine alternative explanations
 for our findings, limits to the generalizability of our conclu-
 sions, why competitor-oriented objectives are adopted, and
 the impact of competitor-oriented objectives on other stake-
 holders. Some experts, for example, suggest that customer
 satisfaction should be the focus of objective setting. We
 have not examined this, but it could be an area that warrants
 research.
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 In the laboratory study, information about their competi-
 tor's performance led more than 40% of subjects to select
 less-profitable alternatives. Replications and extensions
 were conducted so that 23 treatments were conducted in 43
 experimental administrations with 1016 subjects over a
 nine-year period. Even when net present value of profits
 were reported for 20 years, more than one-third of the sub-
 jects chose the less profitable alternative. Another extension
 cast the problem in the past by asking which of two man-
 agers should be retained by the firm; almost 40% of the sub-
 jects decided to keep the manager that sacrificed his own
 firm's profits to do well relative to competitors. In an exten-
 sion of this ex post pricing decision, which stated that the
 market values of the divisions were currently equal (such
 that the only thing that differed was the profit that had been
 earned by each manager), 43% of the subjects favored the
 manager who produced lower profits. A competitor-oriented
 technique, the experience curve, led to less profitable deci-
 sions. Subjects with more management education (which
 presumably emphasizes competitor-oriented objectives)
 made less profitable decisions.
 In the field study of 20 U.S. firms, those with competitor-
 oriented goals had lower ROIs during 1947-1955. Similar
 results were observed for each of three successive nine-year
 periods through 1982, as well as for the nine-year period
 preceding 1947. Firms with competitor-oriented objectives
 were also less likely to survive.
 Our results suggest that the use of competitor-oriented
 objectives is detrimental to profitability. Because of this pat-
 tern of evidence, we suggest that firms should ignore their
 competitors when setting objectives and, instead, focus
 directly on profit maximization. This conclusion has impli-
 cations for managers and management professors. We rec-
 ommend the following:
 *Do not use market share as an objective.
 *Avoid using sports and military analogies, because they foster a
 competitor orientation.
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 *If you use benchmarking, ensure that it does not influence
 objective setting.
 *Do not use management science techniques that are oriented to
 maximizing market share, such as portfolio planning matrices
 and the experience curve.
 *Design information systems to focus attention on the firm's per-
 formance, as measured by profits.
 Because of the evidence to date, we believe that micro-
 economic theory, with its emphasis on profit maximization,
 is the most sensible course of action for firms; that is, man-
 agers should focus directly on profits. Our findings also
 raise concerns about information systems-having informa-
 tion about a competitor's performance may be harmful to a
 person's own performance. Improvements in the ability to
 measure market share, first through surveys and more
 recently through scanner data, might lead to a stronger focus
 on competitiveness and to less profitability.
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